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PREFACE
In accepting AID's invitation to study Korea's long-term
technical assistance needs and their policy implications for the
United States, the Board on Science and Technology for International
Development of the National Academy of Sciences was moved by several
considerations. It sought to fulfill the Acadelny's traditional role
of advisor to Federal Government agencies. It saw in the study an
unusual opportunity to focus on critical determinants of a nation's
development - the mobilization and effective use of its intellectual
resources. Finally, the Board welcomed the opportunity of partici-
pating in the current re-examination of United States relationships
with developing nations, particularly in terms of the contribution
the American scientific and technical community might make in forging
cooperative links with them.
To carry out the study the Board named a panel composed of the
following persons:
Chairman: Dr. Walter Orr Roberts
President
University Corporation for Atmospheric Research
Boulder, Colorado
Dr. Nicholas J. Hoff
Head, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Stanford University
Stanford, California
Dr. Frederick W. Riggs
Professor of Comparative Public Administration
Department of Political Science
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii
Dr. Harold F. Robinson
Vice Chancellor
University System of Georgia
Atlanta, Georgia
Mr. Harry E. Wilhelm
Head, Office of Latin America and the Caribbean
Ford Foundation
New York, New York
Staff
Officer:
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Mr. Julien Engel
Deputy Director
Board on Science and Technology for International
Development
National Academy of Sciences
The circumstances of the study made it necessary for the panel
to proceed with mc:asurcd circumspection in Korea) and \vithout the
collaboration of a locRl counterpart group (unlike the Board's usual
practice in overseas advisory activities). Moreover) the panel had
to address itself to a range of questions extending substantially
beyond those customarily treated by the Board in its consideration
of the application of science and technology to economic development.
In addition to issues of national interest) development strategy,
and institutional "carpentry") the panel dealt \vith matters as diverse
as the place of legal reform in the moderni~ation process) and the
promotion of private and public 'intermediate' institutions in a
society still largely devoid of them.
The panel faced a demanding task in a severely limited time.
It spent only two weeks in Korea) July 14-26) 1969. Several of its
members were new to the field of economic development, though possessing
much experience in international cooperative scientifi.c enterprises.
The small size of the panel negated the possibility of in-depth studies
along sectoral or program lines. Perforce) the panel proceeded as a
group looking at the problem as a whole.
Although the panel had the benefit of extensive briefings by
senior AID officials both in Washington and Korea) it approached its
task without instructions or preconceived ideas. It formed its con-
clusions largely on the basis of its ccnsultations, collectively and/or
individually) in Korea. Individuals and institutions consulted in
Korea were in the fields of government) education) research) i.ndustry,
agriculture, journalism) law) health and family planning, cultural
exchange and otllcTs. Heads of leadi.ng non-Korean agencies) including
the United Nations Develop~cnt Program Representative) as well as a
number of politically or othen,'isc prominent Kore3.l1s were also inter-
vie\,.'ed. (A full list of persons consulted and institutions visited
appears in Annex A.)
The objectives of the mission \'lere defined in the NAS-AID contract
to be as follows:
The study "shall include) but necd not be limited to, the follm;i:1g
areas of investigation:
a) The identification of the needs for technical assistance
during the 1970's and beyond;
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b) The magnitude of foreign and local costs implied by the
identified needs;
c) The types of machinery which might be established to effect
the identified technical assistance;
d) How an administrative institution could be developed, financed,
and coordinated with appropriate U.S. federal agencies, and
nongovernment institutions;
I
e) How support for the Contractor's recommendations might be
generated."
The panel attempted to deal with all of these questions but the
last one, which we believe might be treated more suitably at a later
date. Against the background of limitations on the panel's work, as
noted above, we would emphasize the fact that the findings and reco~ncnd­
ations with respect to points (a) and (b) are offered as tentative and
illustrative, whereas those for points (c) and (d) are firm and specific.
As a further qualification, we would add that the panel's findings
and recommendations represent the collective but not nec~ssarily unanimous
judgment of the individuals who composed it. The report is submitted
solely to AID for use and distribution at its discretion.

-iv-
CONTENTS
Maj or Find ings and Recommendat ions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 1
Part I. The Background
Korean Deve lopment 'II, .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3
The U.S. and Korea 4
Propositions and Observations............. . . . • • • . • . . . . . . . • . . • . .•• • •. 7
Part II. Needs and Problems
Introduction 13
Ba lanced Economic Growth•.•.•.•....•.•..••....•..•..•••.......•.•.•• 14
Economic Planning 14
Industrial Development••.•........•..... ~ •••....•........•...••• 15
Physical Infrastructure, Natural Resources, etc ........•.....•• 15
Agricultural Development.....••...••.•.••......•••......••.....• 15
Human and Intellectual Resources•...•.•......•.•..•.•.•...•.•....•.. 17
Educational Policy, Planning, and Research .•••••....•..••..••.. 18
Primary, Secondary, and Vocational Education •••••....••.•..••.• 18
Higher Education 19
Science Policy, Planning, and Organization •...•........•....••. 21
Cooperation in Science and Technology.....•.••.........•.....••• 22
Scientific and Technical Information .•....•.................... 23
Social and Civic Modernization •.......•......•.••..•...•. :.~ ......•. 24
Urban and Regiona 1 Deve lopment ...••..•....•..........••.....••• 25
Law and Legal Institutions ...•••.•..•...•..•••••••..•...•...••• 26
Public Administration .•...••.•.•.•..••..•.•.....•...•..•••...•• 27
Labor 28
Legislature 29
Social Welfare, Health, and Family Planning •••.......•...•..••• 30
Public Safety 31
The Elements of Technical Cooperation •...........•......•.•.......• 31
Facilitative and Referral Services .....•......•......•......••. 31
Institutional Grants .•••..•..•..........•...•......... ".......•. 31
Individual Fellmvships, Training Grants, etc ••..•............•• 32
Advisors, Specialists, and Visiting Professors .•••..•.•.....•.• 33
U.S.-Korean Collaborative Research and Institutional Linkaf=s ... 33
Sponsorship of Research and Innovative Projects .............•.. 33
Part III. Implementation
-v-
Organization .
Korean-American Development Institution (KAnI).
Financing ..•.....
.35
.38
.42
Interim Measures 44
-1-
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The National Academy of Sciences panel on the future of U.S.
technical assistance to Korea is convinced that Korea will need help
to face a broad range of technical needs and problems in the decade
of the 1970's, and indeed well beyond. Further, we believe the United
States has before it an exceptional opportunity to devise a new
approach centered on cooperation and professional collaboration for
handling future technical interchange between our two countries.
Specifically, we recommend that a new bilateral organization - the
Korean-American Development Institution (KADI) - be established as
the principal instrumentality of technical cooperation and that it be
financially supported by both countries on a long-term basis. Such a
continuing investment by the United States is justified, in our con-
sidered opinion, because Korea has special importance to our country
for historical and strategic reasons and also because the absence of
such aid might impair its further development.
2. Heretofore, U.S. technical aid has supported priority
economic objectives in a Korean development strategy favoring indus-
trialization and build-up of infrastructure. Korea's remarkable
growth testifies to the basic effectiveness of the aid and to the
soundness of the strategy. However, we believe that if it is to
assure itself long-term capability to sustain a high rate of growth
and also to avoid the pitfalls of unbalanced development, Korea will
need in the future to devote greater attention and resources to problems
that it has tended to neglect in areas including rural development,
education, and social welfare. Korea's future technical requirements,
its needs for new competences and capacities, will result in part from
its very success in reaching a higher, more complex level of develop-
ment, and, in part, from the need to confront, largely for the first
time, a wide array of non-economic problems in which the country's
experience needs to be greatly extended.
3. The Korean Government's capability to tackle some of these
problems will need to be stimulated and complemented by the efforts
of nongovernmental institutions. These, in turn, will need encourage~
ment and support. Future U.S.-Korean technical cooperation should
draw inspiration from Title IX legislation and should attempt to serve
the needs of both governmental and nongovernmental sectors.
4. To this end, we recommend that KADI be established as an
autonomous, nongovernmental institution with a broad mandate to
support cooperative programs and activities which will help Korea
achieve balanced economic growth, develop its intellectual and human
resources, and further its social and civic modernization. Our pre-
ference is for a bilateral organization financed by both countries and
...
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governed by a board of able and interested Koreans and Americans,
most of whom should be drawn from the private sector; but we also
consider it possible to make KADI a purely American organization in
the event the Korean Government chooses not to contribute to its core
financing. KADI should be a lean organization operating principally
to stimulate and sustain high quality programs and activities of other
entities by means of grants provided on a matching, topping-up, or
joint participation basis.
5. We recommend that KADI have at its disposal annual funds
equivalent to $5 million, of which (assuming KADI is established as
a bilateral agency) the United States should contribute no more than
80 percent, and Korea the balance. Contributions of both governments
to KADI should be made as unrestricted grants. KADI's core budget
should be assured for at least five years and preferably ten. We
recommend that appropriate U.S. legislation be sought to obtain these
two conditions.
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PART I. THE BACKGROUND
Korean Development
In our view, Korea's mid-1969 profile is one of jagged peaks and
valleys. Of the peaks none is more striking than the country's pre-
sent rate of economic growth. In 1968 it was 13 percent; this year
it is anticipated to rise to 15 percent. Few present-day economies
show such dynamic pace in their development. (Admittedly, Korea, with
a current per capita GNP of only $171, is rising from a very low base.)
Korea's achievement in building the infrastructure of power, transporta-
tion, communications, etc., and in giving itself an almost universally
literate population in less than two decades, bespeaks impressive
national resolve, capability, and performance.
Korea's industrial sector and her export trade have expanded
well beyond the Second Five-Year Plan (1967-1971) projections. The
entry of Japanese industry under the normalization agreement, the
influx of U.S. private investments, and the sizeable earnings Korea
derives from the Vietnam war - all of which became significant after
1965 - account significantly for these exceptional accomplishments.
Korea's economic progress is shown in the following comparative
table:*
1968 (est.)
Total GNP (in millions)
Per Capita GNP
Investment
Savings (domestic)
Agricultural Production Index
(1957 -59 = 100)
Industrial Production (1963 = 100)
Total Exports
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves
3,476
126
459
238
138
108
119
136
5,210
171
1,300
660
142
236
460
409
* Source: AID Program, Presentation to the Congress, Proposed FY 1970
Program
Korea's growth rests on a development strategy that places pre-
ponderant emphasis on industrialization and export of manufactured
goods. These objectives, with the concomitant investments for supporting
infrastructure, currently claim the bulk of the country's resources
and attention. Rapid growth in industrial output is to be maintained
in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan (1972-1976), with perhaps
an even steeper rate of increase in export-related industries. The
purpose is to enable Korea to improve its position in world markets and
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compensate for the anticipated drop in Vietnam earnings. By the mid-
1970's, Korea expects to reach a per capita GNP of $250.
The valleys in this profile reflect the imbalances in the economy
and in the development of the society as a whole produced by Korea's
decision to allocate resources primarily to physical infrastructure
and industrial growth. Agriculture and rural development have
suffered from long neglect, as have education, public health, and other
areas of social welfare and modernization.
Several problems have begun to loom very large. Among these
are a growing disparity in incomes between the urban and rural popula-
- tions; a massive influx of population to the cities, with negative
effects on urban life; urban unemployment and rural underemployment;
and a growing mismatch between what the schools supply and what the
economy demands. All these conditions appear to us to contain the
seeds of potentially serious disaffection •
. Koreans argue persuasively in support of their strategy of national
development. But they also admit that Korea has failed so far to lay
adequate foundations in important areas of economic, social and intellec-
tual development that are needed in the long run to sustain the nation
and the momentum of its growth. Official reports acknowledge that
neglect of farmers, intellectuals and professionals, urban conditions,
etc., may endanger the objectives Korea is now so single-mindedly pur-
suing. Korean leaders are divided about the course to be pursued in
the 1970's. The weight of influence appears to be with those committed
to continued rapid increase in national income through intensive and
large-scale industrialization. The effect of this policy would be
further to postpone attention to the nation's social needs.
The U.S. and Korea
Since World War II the United States has given Korea $4.5 billion
in economic aid and $3 billion in military aid. These considerable sums
provide a measure of the importance the United States has attached to
this country.
Until the early 1960's U.S. economic assistance was used primarily
to promote reconstruction of the country, to furnish it with basic
physical infrastructure and human resources, and to provide the Korean
Government with vital budgetary support. During the past several years
AID has pursued a development policy for Korea emphasizing stabiliza-
tion and growth designed to make the country economically self-supporting
at the earliest date. Programs under this policy have included: (1)
participation and guidance in the formulation of economic plans; (2)
provision of development loans for government infrastructure projects
(power, transportation, etc.), intermediate financial institutions
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(.Medium Industry Bank, Korean Development Finance Corporation), and
private concerns (cement, chemicals, etc.); (3) support to help
Korea reach agreed economic stabilization goals through financing
of needed imports; (4) support to relieve heavy budgetary pressures -
especially military - through allocation of U.S.-owned or controlled
currency for military support; and (5) provision of t~chnical assistance
to Korean government agencies such as those dealing with agriculture,
industrial development, and administrative reform.
The level and distribution of AID's technical assistance in the
past four years may be seen in the table on page 6.
At present AID's technical assistance effort in Korea consists
predominantly of projects scheduled to terminate within th~ next 24
months. ~t may be assumed, however, that public,safety Linternal
security_land family planning - each for its own obviously compelling
reasons - will continue to be favored by American assistance in various
ways beyond that period.) We find it noteworthy that most technical
assistance activities are oriented to objectives which are essentially
economic in character. For instance, excluding a period of assistance
for the upgrading of certain professional schools at Seoul National
University (SNU) , AID has not been able to devote resources to the strength-
ening of higher education in Korea. Nor has it been able to pursue
significant social and political objectives prescribed by Title IX
legislation, especially in areas not directly contributory to economic
growth.
Given AlDis overriding economic concerns, which are fully shared
by Korean economic planners, the application -of U.S. capital and
technical assistance resources has generally served to reinforce and
accentuate the imbalances in the Korean Government's own policies,
as described above.
In making these observations we wish to suggest some of the
tasks that should claim attention in the future rather than to
criticize AID for failing to do that which it did not intend or was
unable to do. We fully appreciate the constraints on resources and
policy options within which AID has had to operate.
The question may now be asked: Why should the United States,
having helped Korea on the road to economic self-sustenance, feel
continued responsibility for that country's domestic evolution? We
believe that our discussion below will touch upon the most important
reasons. First, however, it seems appropriate to look at Korea from
the general standpoint of U.S. national purposes, policy interests,
and standing, in Asia and elsewhere. This perspective suggests
important considerations that support a number of our recommendations:
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AID PROJECT PROGRAM FUNDING IN KOREA
(in thousands)
All All
Prior FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 Future* Final FY
Agric/Rural Dev. 6,197 748 847 769 813 870 72
Water Resources Dev. 110 293 279 319 279 201 71
Mineral Dev. 509 422 72 62 69
Transportation 399 168 96 58 69
Industrial Dev. 3,442 769 265 251 360 120 71
Policy Adv. to ROKG 2,714 895 684 1,042 778 639
Economic Policy (303) (179) (364) (262) (375) 71
Bank/Credit (135) (102) (137) (91) 70
Investment Promotion (46) (29) (75) (91) 70
Education (223) (185) (161) (168) (133) 71
Public Administration (188) (189) (205) (166) (131) 11
Legal Development 100 80
Internal Security
Development Grant 251 209 445 531 485 293 1.-
Supporting Assistance 5,00~/
Family Planning 161 80 1,49ill 20~/ 1 OO~/ 1, 250!.I 12,
KIST 764 3,800 2,625 68
Technical Support 23,577 1,365 1,426 1,198 1,085 2,040 xx
Total Dev. Grant 8,749 6.740 4.230 3.880 xx xx
Total Support Assist. 6.491 1.200 1.000 xx
---B
GRAND TOTAL 8,749 13,231 5,430 4,880 xx xx
-
-
* from Congressional Presentation Source: USAID /Korea
~/ Supporting Assistance
,-7 -
(1) Korea today is largely the product of our huge investment
in that country - financial, military, and other - during
the past 20 years. Its economic achievements are a source
of real satisfaction, but its political and social progress
still leave cause for grave concern. Korea is thus only
half a success story. It remains to be seen whether it can
achieve balanced economic growth and also a stable regime
committed to social justice and fully responsive to the
aspirations of its people. The United States can contribute
significantly towards that end. It is the only one which
in the long run will justify our huge investment in the eyes
of the American people and of many onlookers around the world.
(2) The persistent threat from the North cannot be countered by
military and economic strength alone, important as these may be.
South Korea must also create an alternative way of life that
can generate national solidarity and massive popular support.
(3) The substantial U.S. military presence in Korea, and its
necessary intimacy with and support for the Korean military
establishment, does not have a wholly welcome or desirable
impact on Korean society. To preserve an environment
congenial to such a presence as long as international security
interests may dictate, it is important that the U.S. military
not be the sole substantial American presence in the country
and that counterbalancing efforts to strengthen the foundations
of Korean civic life continue.
(4) Changes in U.S. relations with nations along the rim of the
Asian mainland, accompanied by the reduction or withdrawal
of American military forces from some, may well increase
Korea I s strategic importance to the United States.•
Propositions and Observations
As we went about our task, a number of propositions and observa-
tions which seemed persuasive to us emerged. They influenced the
character and direction of our recommendations for the future of the
U.S. technical aid relationship with Korea. They are:
Korea a pilot case. In our judgment, the policy question facing
the United States with respect to Korea - to which this panel has been
asked to address itself - is of exceptional importance. It has con-
fronted this country twice in recent years, without receiving an
adequate answer, when our aid programs in Taiwan and Iran were brought
to a close. The problem will surely reappear as other countries in
whose development we have played a leading role reach a point at
which we can no longer justify continuation of an aid program of grants,
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loans, and other assistance on concessional terms.
We may safely assume that countries like Korea, will, beyond
that point, continue for a long time to be greatly dependent on the
intellectual and technical resources of the United States and,
furthermore, that private philanthropic and voluntary service contribu-
tions will remain a negligible factor in filling the void that cessa-
tion of conventional government-sponsored assistance will produce.
Under these circumstances, then, we interpret the policy question
in the following sense: Following the phase of conventional capital
and technical aid, how should the United States organize itself to
respond helpfully to Korea's needs, and to what purpose?
The answer to this question may well furnish the basis for a
new course in our relationships with a number of developing nations
that have reached self-sustaining growth, or will attain it in the
near future. Thus we believe that Korea presents a timely pilot case
and that our recommendations, though specific to Korea, also have
wider relevance.
Sustaining the learning process.· The recent "technological gap"
debate and the pleas by Europeans for a new "technological" Marshall
Plan have served to illuminate the disparities (more social and mana-
gerial than technical, as recent studies have shown) existing even
among highly-developed nations. Two points are worth noting: (1)
despite their strength and resourcefulness, their easy access to
and great diversity of interactions with the United States, Europeans
found that their countries were lagging increasingly behind the
United States in critical sectors; and (2) the Europeans were convinced
that the problems could be alleviated only through a large, organized,
U.S. Government-sponsored effort.
What, then, is to be said of a nation - with a per capita GNP of
$171 - only recently liberated from a static traditional, agrarian
past?
The question is by no means rhetorical, in view of the currency
and appeal that the notion of "graduation" for aid-receiving countries
has achieved in the United States during the past six or eight years.
We consider this notion dangerous and deluding, even though it expresses
well enough our impatience to see a job completed. Moreover, declining
appropriations, plus statutory limitations imposed on AID regarding
the total number of countries eligible for major categories of
assistance, have placed AID under great pressures. There is a con-
sequent urgency to "discharge" countries completely, like patients
from an overcrowded hospital, as soon as they appear to have become
"ambulatory."
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To pursue these metaphors further, "graduation" does not signify
the end of the learning process, nor "discharge" an assurance that the
patient no longer needs special care. However self-evident or elemen-
tary, these arguments point the way to the responsibility the United
States should assume in the new phase of its relationship with a
developing nation. In our view, that responsibility is to ensure that
the developing nation's learning process (by which we mean the sum
total of its intellectual and professional interactions with the world
at large, as well as its capacity to absorb new ideas) keeps on ex-
panding vigorously, to stimulate the forces of internal change and to
strengthen the bases for further growth.
This process does not have a built-in, self-generating momentum,
especially in view of its dependence on hard currency resources and
(to no small extent) on external initiatives. It is precisely in the
allocation of its still very scarce foreign exchange resources that a
nation now forced to earn its own way, and unsure of its long-term
prospects, is driven to favor the importation of "hardware" in pre-
ference to "software." Without benefit of specific financial support
or the incentive of monetary reward, the outreach of counterpart
individuals or institutions in the United States scarely extends beyond
the water's edge.
Recent budget cuts have caused a sharp decline in the two-way
intellectual traffic between Korea and the United States previously
supported by the Fulbright and State Department educational and pro-
fessional exchange programs. The resulting sense of isolation and
abandonment enveloping the Korean intellectual and professional
community gives timely warning of what may be expected, on a much
larger scale, if provision is not made for a bridge to be kept open
between the two countries. Most important, we believe that this will
require a long-term commitment on the part of the United States, well
beyond the next decade. We cannot emphasize strongly enough the-need
for the United States to recognize and accept the fact that no developing
country - especially one of the low income type that Korea represents -
can stand a total severance of aid from the United States without jeop-
ardy to the progress already made and serious harm to the effort it
must maintain in the years ahead.
The inexhaustibility of technical needs. The very nature and
substance of technical assistance conspire to perpetuate the need for
it. Acquired expertise attenuates or becomes stale; research equip-
ment runs down; books become out-of-date; and new institutions - especially
academic ones - lose their initial vigor if no provision is made for
their regeneration or self-renewal. (This happens to be the case in
Korea.) In short, the competences and capacities that technical assis-
tance transmits have a built-in tendency to degenerate which few
developing nations are able to redress.
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In the conventional technical assistance relationship, the
juxtaposition of urgent, abounding needs and limited resources puts
great pressure on donor and recipient government alike to move rapidly
from one bottleneck problem to another - without a backward glance.
Thus, the beneficial impact of a university-to-university contract -
e.g. Minnesota and Seoul National University - begins to dissipate
virtually on its termination.
Two other factors heighten a developing nation's dependence on
the knowledge resources of the developed world. One is the changing
character of a dynamically growing society, which generates demands
for ever newer and different types of knowledge. From the straight-
,forward acquisition of the basic skills, basic technologies, and
basic institutions necessary to attain a minimum of economic viability,
a developing nation must move on to attack progressively more complex
problems of political, industrial, and social organization.
The other factor stems from the interaction of technological
progress in advanced societies with the patterns of international
trade. An industrially developing nation, whose economic growth rests
on the export of manufactured goods, in the production of which her
industries have attained comparative advantage becomes steadily more
vulnerable to technological and market changes that occur abroad. To
ensure her own survival in the endless competition for markets, the
developing nation must acquire an increasingly sensitive perception
of these changes, a capability for fast reactions, and skill in adapting
its local conditions to the most efficient technologies emerging abroad.
Limitations of government-to-government technical cooperation.
Technical cooperation channeled conventionally on a government-to-govern-
ment basis is subject to influences and constraints that severely limit
its range of impact. Technical cooperation is generally designed to
support the immediate economic objectives of both governments - one
impelled to achieve basic self-sufficiency in record time, the other
driven to disengage itself as rapidly as possible. Program priorities
are hence confined to the sector of prime urgency, and all too often
projects are shaped by considerations of short-term feasibility, quick
payoffs, and the clearly limited continuity of involvement of the donor.
Political timidity or "discretion"; rigid programming requirements; the
tenuousness of official relationships with the nongovernmental sector;
all tend to make government-to-government technical assistance a tunnel-
visioned, single-track effort. Its net effect is to reinforce the
strength of the central government and of leading economic units to
the neglect of other no less vital sectors of society.
We believe that the political and social objectives of Title IX
legislation are peculiarly appropriate to Korea at this stage of its
development. As the concept of "popular participation" suggests, the
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intent of Title IX (among other purposes) is to stimulate a broader
distribution of material benefits as well as the diffusion of poli-
tical power among all layers and sectors of a developing society.
It may, however, be unrealistic to expect the Korean Government
readily to make such objectives its own. The strategy of concentrating
resources on areas of prime growth does not lend itself to a policy
of distributive justice. Furthermore, a highly centralized and author-
itarian government is naturally disinclined to build up extra-govern-
mental 'centers of influence that might challenge its judgment or limit
its authority.
Nonetheless, we believe that the Korean Government, surely moti-
vated to keep the country's economic development purposeful and stable,
will come to appreciate the advantage of moving toward the objectives
discussed above. We feel, further, that this shift in emphasis could
be realized sooner rather than later, given a new American technical
cooperation effort characterized by more freedom of action than has
been possible for the present program in responding to needs other than
the first priorities of the Korean Government.
A system of pluralistic linkages. For Korea, as perhaps also
for other nations at a similar stage of development, the critical
requirement is no longer the procurement of specific bits of advice
or assistance for readily perceived, discrete problems and needs,
numerous as these still are. It is, rather, the acquisition of insti-
tutional machinery, established channels, and effective procedures, plus
assured means of support, whereby Korea - for both governmental and
private-sector purposes - may continue well into the future to avail
itself of the knowledge and professional expertise from abroad necessary
to sustain the processes of modernization.
Conversely, the problem for the United States is to provide means
which will foster and promote pluralistic relationships and ·linkages
between this country and Korea, in the interest of both the public and
private sectors of the two countries. These relationships, whose
character should become increasingly nongovernmental, are commonly found
among developed countries. They will be necessary, ultimately, to a
developing country if it is to become truly self-sustaining.
Accent on cooperation. As has already been suggested, the tech-
nical needs Korea will face in the next phase of its development are
in many ways of a second-generation order, different both in nature
and scope from the type of technical assistance hitherto required.
These needs stem from the increasing complexity of Korea's economy,
and its pattern of social evolution. They relate also to the present
availability of highly qualified manpower inKorea in certain fields
and to the country's desire both in and out of government to exercise
greater responsibility and initiative in determining what it needs and
what it should do.
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These circumstances call for new types of technical support and
interchange, better and more genuinely characterized as "cooperation"
than as "assistance." Many opportunities for the conventional trans-
fer of skills will remain. But in many areas there are complex new
problems that will no longer yield to straightforward "know-how,
show-how" tutelage. Their solution requires the cooperation of both
foreign and local professionals in joint research and experimentation.
Such professional collaboration offers the most promising approach
to building up a developing country's problem-solving capability. It
is clear that as Korea's development places increased demand on research
(in areas such as social behavior or urban problems, for example) joint
effort can be expected more and more to yield benefit to both parties.
The interchangeable use of the expressions "technical assistance"
and "technical cooperation" tends to conceal important differences in
the motivation and attitude of both donor and recipient countries.
The panel finds it desirable to apply "technical assistance" to the
funding aspect (which is likely to be concessiona1) and "technical
cooperation" to the activity or project instruments sustained there\<lith
as well as to the spirit of professional collaboration which should
animate the effort. We believe that future relationships between the
so-called "donor" or "advisor" and the "recipient" or "advisee" will
call for marked changes. There will be need for a much greater sense
of intellectual and professional parity between the parties. This may
require a rise in quality and a lowering of the age level of the
Americans working with Koreans, to ensure a more productive match between
the Americans and the growing number of young, able, well-trained Koreans
holding positions of executive responsibility. In the past, the Korean's
image of the United States has been that of a "shadow government." This
was the consequence of pervasive AID involvement in major areas of
decision-making. The new relationships should be free of this notion.
They should seek to bolster Korea's newfound sense of self~~onfidence
and independence through genuine professional cooperation. The Korean-
American Development Institution, the establishment of which we pro-
pose in Part III of this report, is conceived with this end in view.
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PART II. NEEDS AND PROBLEMS
Introduction
Part I of the report presented a number of general considerations
to explain why Korea will continue to have needs and problems requir-
ing assistance from abroad, why these should continue to deserve atten-
tion from the United States, and why future attention should be expressed
in new ways.
_In Part II the panel reports on its examination of some of these
needs and problems (in broad, illustrative terms) and presents measures
that seem appropriate to meet them. Part III contains the panel's
recommendations for the creation of a new organization the Korean-
American Development Institution, to serve as the central instru-
mentality for mobilizing and administering American resources for long-
term technical cooperation with Korea.
On the basis of the panel's limited exposure to Korea, we do not
presume to speak with authority and in detail on the requirements for
assistance that this complex and dynamic society may have. We state
the strongest of our impressions, realizing full well that each member
of the panel has a slightly different slant on the important issues,
and that persons with much longer experience may see things differently.
We have proceeded on three assumptions:
(1) That for the purpose of this report it would suffice to pre-
sent a discussion of critical areas in which necessary and
significantly useful technical assistance may be rendered in
the future; and that these critical areas relate t9. certain
-major and enduring goals shared by the Korean and United States
Governments;
(2) That the above analysis should lend itself to the formulation
of a tentative work program, budgeted according to major cate-
gories of activity, for the purpose of indicating a desirable
level of long-term annual spending;
(3) That in view of the organization (KADI) and procedures that we
recolmncnd for the future, it would be inappropriate for this
panel to go beyond the foregoing assumptions, or to pronounce
ourselves concerning such aspects as the long-term order of
priorities, the relative allocation of funds among them, or the
desired mix of program activities. As stressed in a later part
of this report, consideration of these variables, and their rela-
tive weighting, would be an important function of KADI's future
management.
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We believe that there are three major and enduring goals shared
by the Korean and U.S. Governments, which provide structure and focus
to a long-term technical cooperation program. These goals are to:
1. Promote Korea's balanced economic growth;
2. Develop its human and intellectual resources;
3. Further its social and civic modernization.
A discussion of Korea's needs and problems in terms of these goals
follows:
Balanced Economic Growth
Economic growth has been the major goal in the past, claiming the
bulk of AID's technical assistance resources. Though its importance
will not diminish, the overall demands of the economic sector on U.S.-
sponsored technical assistance (excluding the field of agriculture)
may be expected to decline as Korea becomes progressively more able to
pay for particular services needed from the United States, and as it
takes advantage of increasing opportunities for cooperation with Japan,
other industrial countries, and international agencies.
Economic Planning. The essential mechanisms for effective decision-
making (Economic Planning Board) and for vital economic processes (official
investment banks, taxation system, etc.) have already been successfully
implanted, largely with AID assistance. Korea has reached a high degree
of self-sufficiency in basic cadres for economic planning and analysis.
Nevertheless, it continues to need high-level foreign expertise: to
fill gaps in specific fields where it still lacks strength, and to
provide external counsel and professional support for its own planning
efforts. Both forms of help will be particularly needed during the
latter phase of the formulation of the Third Five-Year Plan (1972-1976).
Requests for u.s. advisory services in economic planning and related
fields (fiscal and monetary policy, international trade and finance,
etc.) should continue to receive sympathetic attention, in view of past
u.s. involvement and the intrinsic interest of the subject.
\
However, serious consideration should also be given to the Economic
Planning Board (EPB) proposal for a Korean Institute of Development
Economics. and generally to Korea's efforts to acquire a more adequate
indigenous planning capability and self-confidence. The proposed
Institute's functions would be to conduct ongoing basic research on
Korea's development, to provide training in analytical techniques to
people in universities, government, banking and private business, and to
assist government in the formulation of long-range planning and development
strategies.
We feel these purposes might be served more effectively and objec-
tively by an institution with independent academic standing wholly divorced
from government, rather than by one directly affiliated with the EPB.
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Industrial Development. Diversified industrial development will
undoubtedly generate a vast and long-continuing array of technical
needs. But to a large extent these will be met through commercial
channels outside of government-supported programs. The sharp decline
of AID-funded activity in this sector in recent years is perhaps
indicative of this trend. The industrial sector, enjoying top priority
in Korea's development plan, has access to hard currency. It can
therefore make straightforward purchases of the technical services it
needs from abroad. Moreover, private .foreign investment has become
increasingly important in Korea's industrialization and can be expected
to become the major vehicle for the transfer of technology and technical
services.
However, modern industrial management is an important potential
area for technical cooperation. The demand for professionally trained
managers will soar in the coming decade. Korea will need help to
achieve an adequate local training capability in this field. Considera-
tion might be given to assistance for the upgrading of existing schools
of business administration and management or for the establishment of
a wholly new institution, or both.
Specific areas of weakness in Korean industry (quality control,
cost co~trol, etc.) to which the Korean Productivity Center (KPC)
addresses itself, might be met by the provision of consultants and
advisors to KPC plus training opportunities for its staff members
abroad. Both approaches would strengthen KPC's services to Korean
industry.
Other industrial countries (Japan, West Germany, etc.) are acqu1r1ng
strong interest in Korea's economy through trade and investment. They
may be expected to provide Korea with an increasingly broad range of
cooperative assistance, as in fact Japan already has in suc~ fields as
productivity and technical training.
Physical Infrastructure, Natural Resources, and Energy Development.
As with industrial development, Korea's growing foreign exchange re-
sources earmarked for physical infrastructure, natural resources, and
energy development, as well as her ability to secure foreign loans,
should make her able to pay for most forms of technical assistance
required for these purposes from abroad. Korea will require various
types of facilitative and referral assistance to secure participation
and services of appropriate U.S. Government agencies and private con-
sulting organizations, primarily for surveys, and for engineering and
feasibility studies.
Agricultural Development. Despite considerable AID capital and
technical investment in the agricultural sector, and the establishment
of essential rural development institutions, the progress of this
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sector still falls far short of requirements for balanced economic
growth. Crop yields are well below their potential; agricultural
productivity is nearly static; rural incomes are lagging increasingly
behind rural incomes; and Korea's substantial foreign currency ex-
penditures on food imports impede her overall growth. One cause may
be the ambivalent attitude of national policy-makers toward the
agricultural sector and their tendency to downgrade its importance
in the Korean economy. Other causes include the difficulty of in-
ducing change in a rural world bound by isolation, enormous debt,
uneconomic, small landholdings, and unfavorable pricing policies.
Governmental failure - at national and local levels - to approach
agricultural development with systematic, comprehensive, and persistent
efforts in training, research and extension; its inability to formulate
sound credit and marketing policies, and to acquire effective planning
and management capabilities: all these indicate some of the tasks that
remain to be tackled.
We believe that real progress in the agricultural sector is
critically important for the future stability and well-being of Korea
and that there is need for continuity of the technical and advisory
presence the United States has maintained in this field. We conclude
that agriculture and rural development should remain a prime element
of future U.S.-Korean technical cooperation, at a level of funding
perhaps even higher than in the past.
Needs for advisory activities at many levels of decision-making
that affect both technical and policy matters will persist. However,
the major thrusts of a continued technical cooperation program should
be directed to the strengthening of Korea's capabilities in agricultural
research and development and teaching, as well as in planning and economic
analysis. The Office of Rural Development and the SNU College of
Agriculture, were they to collaborate rather than ignore each other,
could with the aid of technical cooperation inputs provide a base for
the development of an effective integrated teaching, research and
development program. In this connection, the recent proposal jointly
submitted by these two institutions to the Rockefeller Foundation re-
presents a promising step forward. We subscribe to the substance of
that proposal. In the absence of foundation sponsorship, we believe
support for the purposes sought should be made a part of the broader
program of technical cooperation in agriculture advocated here.
Lack of competence in economic and statistical research and
analysis in the Ministry of Agriculture has handicapped agricultural
policy development and long-range planning. Advisory and training
assistance will be required to help the Ministry set up an appropriate
unit, and also to strengthen the Agricultural Economics Institute in
the Office of Rural Development. With enhanced planning capability and
better economic data, Korea should be able to use techniques of modern
systems analysis in the formulation of her agricultural policy, con-
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certing diverse factors and inputs required to achieve her objective,
whether these be increased production of a single crop or the better
utilization of an agricultural area.
These objectives might be achieved through long-term contract
missions from an American institution or consortium of institutions.
Human and Intellectual Resources
Poor in"natural resources and arable land, Korea must rely for her
economic advancement on the most efficient use of her most conspicuous
asset, the skills of her population of 30 million. In emulation of
Japan, whose resource base is similar, Korea has chosen industrializa-
tion as the most productive means of mobilizing her people for develop-
ment. The success of this strategy rests on at least two imperatives:
(1) the availability of an educated and skilled labor force; and (2) a
capacity to use science and technology as the motive forces of develop-
ment.
For a nation but recently emerged from an agrarian, traditional
past, these imperatives necessitate the compression of great intellectual
and cultural changes into the lifespan of a single generation, changes
that modern industrial nations such as Japan underwent over the course
of a century.
There is evidence of awareness by the Korean Government that such
changes must be planned. Its ambitious manpower-development schemes
and programs for the promotion of science and technology so testify.
However, there is less evident of an ability or willingness by the Govern-
ment to finance or execute these measures.
Education in Korea has undergone two revolutionary transformations
since World War II: an explosive growth, especially in secondary and
higher education; and a fundamental though not yet pervasive shift in
orientation from Japanese to American educational philosophy. AID
capital and technical assistance and the efforts of other public and
private American agencies have contributed decisively to these changes
over the years.
Korea's school system, particularly at the secondary and higher
levels, now faces acute problems, the consequences of rapid, uncontrolled
expansion, heightened by the society's changing character and require-
ments. Government institutions have been badly under-financed. So,
too, have most of the private institutions, which bear the brunt of
secondary and higher education, though free of effective government
supervision. Severe overcrowding, teacher shortages, outmoded and
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unbalanced curricula, lack of materials and equipment - all combine
to produce instruction of generally low quality and often of limited
relevance. The distribution of graduates according to specia1tie~
has little relation, either in numbers or quality, to actual man-
power needs of the various sectors of the economy. In addition,
Korea still has only limited capability to provide doctoral-level
training at home and virtually none in the sciences, engineering,
and agriculture. Obliged to send her best students abroad to obtain
advanced qualifications, Korea has become especially vulnerable to
the "brain drain."
The establishment of the National Council for Long-Range Compre-
hensive Educational Planning early this year suggests that the Korean
Government is about to set a new course in the field of education.
Significant reform of Korean education, if it should come about,
will generate considerable financial needs, most of which Korea will
have to meet from her own resources, supplemented by loans from bi-
lateral and multilateral sources. It will also generate many tech-
nical needs which the panel feels the United States, in view of its
prior role in Korean education, should attempt to supply within the
framework of a technical cooperation program as suggested below.
Educational Policy, Planning, and Research. AID is already
assisting the Long-Range Planning Council by underwriting the adv~sory
services of several American educational specialists. Needs for top-
level advisory and consultative services will undoubtedly persist
for years. The recommendations of the Council will themselves generate
demands for additional varieties of expertise. Some of these will have
to be obtained via American specialists, while others will have to be
acquired by Koreans in training programs in the United States. Demands
on the few educational and manpower-research institutes (Korean Institute
for Research in Behavioral Sciences, Central Education Research Institute,
SNU Educational Research Institute, Institute of Population Problems,
Manpower Development Research Institute, etc.) for research, analytical,
advisory, and materials development services, can be expected to multiply
greatly. The capacity of these units to respond effectively will need
to be considerably strengthened.
Primary, Secondary, and Vocational Education. The free, compul-
sory six-year primary cycle, to which the government now devotes over
three fourths of its education budget, does not appear to be of immedi-
ate concern to Korea's officials. The critical bottleneck lies in the
long-neglected secondary and vocational-technical segments of the
educational system. These supply the bulk of trained manpower to Korea's
industry and agriculture, but receives far less (about 15 percent) of
the nation's budget for education.
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This allocation may be enlarged slightly in the future. The
designated funds will still fall far short of meeting Korea's enor-
mous, urgent requirements for qualified teachers, buildings, new
curricula, and equipment. Korea is accordingly giving serious con- j
sideration to new educational technologies - wide-scale educational
television, programmed instruction, team teaching, etc. - as the
only hope for closing the gap.
Korea has contracted for a $14.8 million loan from the World
Bank to upgrade a number of secondary and post-secondary vocational
and technical training institutions. AID is also contemplating an
educational loan of similar magnitude, with the still tentative ob-
jectives of further strengthening secondary and post-secondary voca-
tional and technical training, of equipping university science and
engineering departments, and of providing various inputs related to
the development of educational television. This loan and others that
Korea might obtain in the future from the United States will normally
include the technical assistance costs entailed by the project(s)
being financed. To the extent that Korea resorts to U.S.-financed
loans, she will need various facilitative and referral services in
the recruitment of American personnel, the placement of Koreans in
American educational and training institutions, and the procurement
of equipment on the U.S. market.
While loans may dispose of certain large-cost programs, the scale
and complexity of the reform and modernization task will undoubtedly
stimulate many additional requirements for discrete types of assistance,
especially of an experimental or innovative character. For example,
Korea may find it profitable to explore the applicability of advanced
training techniques developed and used in American industry, in non-
academic institutions, and in the defense establishment.
Higher Education. Of the large number of establishments in Korea's
system of higher education, only a few can claim to be institutions of
higher learning by the standards of advanced countries. Seoul National
University and the privately supported Korea, Yonsei, and Ewha Women's
Universities are among the most important. The Korean Government has
pursued an essentially laissez-faire policy in higher education, de-
voting to it less than 10 percent of its education budget, leaving it
to private expenditure and private initiative to satisfy the bulk of
the nation's demands for higher-level manpower. Consequently, there
are very wide qualitative disparities in the system, which may be over-
come, at least in part, through public action, such as the imposition
of curricular standards and accreditation criteria. The Korean Govern-
ment recently took measures to control university admissions by
national examination and to limit student enrollments by stricter enforce-
ment of institutional quotas.
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From the standpoint of our inquiry, the chief deficiency of
Korea's higher education is the absence of centers of advanced teaching
and research appropriate for a nation of Korea's size, capabilities.
and ambitions. (It bears noting that it generally takes such centers
eight to ten years, if not longer. to reach full development.) Korea
needs centers sufficient in quality, number. and diversity to: (1) pro-
vide the country with high-level manpower over a broad professional
and disciplinary spectrum; (2) give the nation the intellectual. cul-
tural, and scientific stature necessary for self-sustaining interaction
with more advanced countries; and (3) relate the academic community
and its resources more closely to the development effort of the nation.
We are aware of the ten-year comprehensive development plan recent~
formulated by SNU. This plan envisages administrative and academic in-
tegration of the colleges and schools, improvement of graduate education
and research. and restructuring of undergraduate programs. These changes
should open the way for modernization of the University's entire educa-
tional process. Since SNU is the most prestigious institution of higher
education in Korea. its initiative can be expected to have wide impact
throughout Korea.
Without committing ourselves to the details of the ten-year plan.
it is clear to us that SNU should be given every encouragement and
support to realize its goals. We would consider it unwise. however.
to restrict U.S. participation in such an effort to SNU alone. thereby
risking creation of an unbridgeable gulf between it and other ranking
Korean institutions. They are critically important national resources.
Since it is government-supported. SNU will probably have less difficulty
financing its development than the private universities.
We therefore propose a long-term multi-institutional development
program to help several key universities, including at least one
provincial institution, make needed improvements in administration,
teaching, research, curriculum, library and laboratory facilities, etc.
Primary emphasis should be placed on their graduate programs, to help
individual departments which already possess graduate disciplinary
strength to reach full doctoral-level teaching and research competence
in fields relevant to national needs.
Clearly. Korea has reached a point in its development that warrants
such competence. The availability of advanced, high-quality centers
will reduce the outflow of talented students seeking training in foreign
universities, and hence lower the risk of losing them to the '~rain
drain," and will also draw back to Korea outstanding scholars who have
settled abroad. The experience of the Korean Institute of Science and
Technology (KIST) suggests the availability in the United States and
elsewhere of a large pool of Korean talent willing to return if offered
favorable incentives. (Taiwan has recently made this type of approach
-21-
in the principal f~elds of science, engineering, agriculture, and
economics, albeit through the establishment of special inter-
university centers of advanced study having their own higher-salaried
special chairs. This approach may commend itself to Korea also.)
A program of assistance might,include support for training and
updating for Korean staff, visiting professors and specialists (Korean
and American) from the United States, and books and equipment. Atten-
tion should also be paid to the infrastructure for these institutions,
e.g., libraries, documentation services, and publishing facilities.
Other elements of higher education also warrant attention and
support. These include professional societies, learned bodies, inter-
disciplinary research councils, and units that can cut across and link
the differentiated and competitive institutions that now dominate and
divide the Korean academic scene.
Science Policy, Planning, and Organization. The Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST), established in 1967, is now the
Korean Government's chief advisory, planning, and coordinating agency
for the promotion of science and technology. With its wide range of
responsibilities, MOST may become a powerful instrument for organizing
the nation's scientific and technological effort. As a counterpart to
the Economic Planning Board, MOST relates manpower, research and develop-
ment and technical assistance requirements to growth and development
targets set by the economic planners. MOST screens the Ministries' pro-
posed research and development projects for technical merit and adherence
to research and development investment guidelines. MOST is also engaged
in studies and forecasts of long-range manpower needs and national
research and development goals, which are to be reflected in future
development plans.
Because of its probable future impact on planning and "resource
allocations, we feel that MOST might benefit considerably from periodic
external reviews and critiques of its policy-formulation processes
and priorities, its manpower and technology forecasts, and its efforts
to coordinate research and development within government. It is open
to question whether MOST has adequate organization or statutory au-
thority to perform effectively "the tasks and functions implicit in
the conduct of a comprehensive national s~ience policy. "(For instance,
we fail to find within the structure and activities of MOST or of any
other Korean agency a mechanism comparable to our National Science
Foundation, which can support basic research in universities and
independent institutes.) A formal review procedure, such as that employed
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEC~), or
an informal workshop approach such as that developed by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences in its various bilateral science cooperation programs,
would help reveal structural and other weaknesses and ensure the soundness
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of this critical input into Korea's planning and decision-making pro-
cesses. Indeed, senior officials of MOST might benefit from partici-
pation in special science-policy programs at leading U.S. universities.
Cooperation in Science and Technology. We believe that in KIST
Korea possesses an institution of remarkable potential as an aid to in-
dustry and government in solving their technical problems and as a sym-
bol of the excellence and modernity that must characterize the scientif-
ic effort. Development of Korean science and technology should go well
beyond KIST, ·however. In recent years this institution appears to have
become the consuming preoccupation of Korean leaders, seemingly to the
neglect of other, equally urgent matters.
KIST aside, the general condition of Korean science and technology
is one of acute poverty. As official reports acknowledge, the allocation
of national resources to this sector is grossly inadequate for minimal
needs, not to speak of Korea's ambitious goal to attain a high level of
scientific and technological proficiency by the mid-1980's.*
- There is no defined policy to allocate a reasonable fraction of
national research and development investment to the support of university
basic research. The value of applied, problem-solving research appears
well enough appreciated by economic planners and political decision-
makers. The importance of basic research, as a necessary element in
the training of the nation's future scientists and technologists, is not
recognized.
- Many of the nationally supported research and technical service
laboratories appear to operate at a very 10'J level of productivity.
Yet these laboratories consume 95 percent of the government's annual
$10 million research and development budget. Among the causes are
weak management, unrealistic project selection, poor-quality. staff, and
inadequate financing.
- Korean university scientists and technologists have relatively
few contacts with their counterparts in more advanced countries. For
this reason, in part, their modest research activities lack competence
and relevance.
~valuation Report of the Second Year Program, 1968.
Year Economic Development Plan. Office of Planning
for the Prime Minister, ROKG, June 1969.
The Second Five
and Coordination
Long Term Manpower Forecast and Development Policy, 1967-1968. MOST, RO~
December 1968.
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- Equipment and facilities available for the teaching of science
and technology at all levels of the educational system meet only a
small fraction of the estimated requirenlents.
Many of these problems can be remedied only by the allocation of
substantially greater resources by the Korean Government. The situ-
ation of certain selected establishments might be further aided through
institutional developnlent grants referred to earlier.
As part. of a total approach to these problems we call attention
to important opportunities for promoting the development of Korean
science and technology via organized bi-national cooperative projects.
These might take the form of workshops exposing top-level officials
from various Korean ministries, plus leading individuals in the pri-
vate sector, to the experience and ideas of informed American counter-
part groups in broad areas related to the application of science and
technology to economic development. Such workshops should serve to
heighten awareness of key policy problems, promote inter-agency formu-
lation of recommendations entailing coordinated effort and cOnlffiitment, ) S~
and motivate appropriate action. Current programs of the National
Academy of Sciences in eight countries of Asia and Latin America sug-
gest the effectiveness of this approach.
The performance of the national laboratories might benefit appre-
ciably from periodic consultations with visiting co~~ittees or individ-
uals drawn from counterpart institutions in the United States, and by
the establishment of direct channels to foster exchange of research
personnel and information. Further, the capacities of individual
researchers, research institutes, and educational institutions might
be considerably enhanced by the undertaking of joint research projects
with cooperating units in the United States. The U.S.-Japan Program
for Scientific Cooperation offers a particularly relevant model,
though its emphasis is on collaborative research activity conducted
mostly in Japan by individual American and Japanese scientists.
Scientific and Technical Information. The Korean Science and
Technology Information Center (KORSTIC) has made promising beginnings
in systematizing the inflow and diffusion of information on scientific
and technical developments published in Korean and foreign journals.
With its forthcoming relocation in a new, specially designed and equip-
ped building, its projected shift in the early 1970's to electronic data
processing and advanced distribution techniques (teletypewriters, etc.),
and its intended greatly enlarged canvass of foreign titles, KORSTIC
has the opportunity to pioneer in a field in which few developing coun-
tries have made significant headway.
KORSTIC's services are at present limited to the processing of
periodical literature. It has not established liaison with the important
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data banks of international organizations (the U.N. 's Food and Agri-
culture Organization, Industrial Development Organization, for in-
stance), or of national agencies in the United Staces and Western
Europe. (The Clearing House for Federal Scientific and Technical
Information, a unit of the U.S. Department of Commerce, is one of a
number of major American information sources KORSTIC could tap.)
As Korea's central channel for the procurement of foreign sci-
entific and technical information, KORSTIC warrants continuing atten-
tion. In particular, it should be helped to take advantage of freely
available information services abroad, and to orient itself to the
rapidly changing information technology and international information-
exchange systems of this era.
Social and Civic Modernization
We propose to use the term "social and c~v~c modernization" as a
unifying concept for a variety of problem areas that are predominantly
social and political in character. Some of these fit logically under
this heading by virtue of conventional definition; others do so con-
veniently by virtue of Title IX considerations. Most of these prob-
lem areas bear close relation to higher education since they require
enhanced indigenous capability in various types of advanced training
and research. Among these the social science disciplines are par-
ticularly relevant to social and civic modernization and provide ex-
ceptional opportunities for genuinely cooperative and mutually bene-
ficial activities by Korean and American professionals.
We consider here only a few, more visible problem areas, primarily
to illustrate the crucial relevance of social and civic modernization
to the future development of Korea. We are mindful of the fact that in
a situation of dynamic growth, problems infringe upon each other and
are not easily categorized or treated under separate heading's.
Although we mention such matters as law and legal institutions,
labor and legislative processes, etc., we wish to emphasize that we
have not had an opportunity to study these aspects in depth, nor to
consider adequately new ways of bringing technical cooperation to bear
upon them. Our analyses and prescriptions make no attempt at origin-
ality. They are intended rather to convey the importance of these
problem areas, and the need for a new organization, KADI, to devote
sustained attention and study to them in coming years.
Special note needs to be made of The Asia Foundation, in Korea,
which, through its manner of operation and its program emphasis, serves
as an important instrument to achieve Title IX objectives. Nearly all
the problem areas upon which it has focused its very modest resources
will, under one guise or another, deserve long-term application and
support.
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We recognize that, at the level of national policy-making, the
termination of the U.S. capital-assistance program may greatly reduce
whatever opportunity ,~e may have had to influence the Korean Govern-
ment tm~ard fulfillment of Tit Ie IX objectives. Ho\<Jever, we see
alternative possibilities for the future through the use of technical
cooperation resources planned and applied in combination with external
loans.
We also sense significant possibilities of enlarging government
awareness of.social problems and of influencing official policy through
sponsorship of independent policy-oriented studies prepared by Korean
academic and other qualified groups.
Urban and Regional Development. Unprecedented industrial growth,
labor migration, and urbanization present Korea with vast new problems:
sharp regional disparities; widened gaps in welfare between city and
country, and between new migrants and established city-dwellers; and
inadequacy of urban facilities and services. Urban conditions will
worsen considerably in the coming decade as the population continues to
shift from the countryside to the cities.
The Korean Government has indicated its intent to make regional
planning an integral part of national planning, in the formulation of
its Third Five-Year Plan, in order to obtain a more balanced distribu-
tion of national investments among the provinces and regions. It hopes
that among other measures a policy of industrial dispersion will produce
a more equitable spread of the benefits of economic growth, as well as
a reduction of population pressure on the principal urban centers. Con-
currently, the government and city administrations (with Seoul impres-
sively in the lead) will turn to the enormous problems of the cities
themselves, developing long-term programs in housing, transportation,
utilities, etc.
The tasks of regional and urban planning call for a vast array of
skills from virtually all the applied disciplines and professions. The
scope and irrevocability of many regional and urban planning decisions
make it mandatory that Korea have highly qualified personnel with sub-
stantial experience, yet such personnel are in short supply in Korea.
This will make her dependent on foreign advisors and technicians in
the years immediately ahead. Korea has already applied to the United
Nations Development Program for a team of specialists in physical
regional planning, and to the United States for the long-term services
of an expert experienced in coordinating the work of regional planning
at the national level. She has also requested other planning and tech-
nical experts, including an urbanologist, for shorter-term assignments.
These are initial needs, occasioned by the preparation of the Third
Five-Year Plan. Others, of a perhaps more diversified character, can be
/
I
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expected to materialize as Korea moves from overall planning to imple-
mentation, and formulates more systematic and comprehensive programs
to alleviate the plight of her cities.
We believe that Korean higher education will have a key role to
play in developing Korean competence in urban and regional planning and
research. A promising program, now in its second year, is the multi-
disciplinary Department of Urban and Regional Planning of the SNU Grad-
uate School of Public Administration. This year, Yonsei University
established the Institute of Urban Problems. Both of these centers de-
serve attention and support.
The United States is, of course, beset with grave urban development
problems of its own. In responding to Korea's needs for experts in this
and related fields, it may be that our country can gain as much from
this type of technical cooperation as can Korea itself.
Law and Legal Institutions. The modernization of Korean law and
legal institutions confronts the nation with one of its most challenging
tasks. In the midst of great social and economic change Korea contin-
ues to make do with what appears to be an archaic, rudimentary legal
system increasingly irrelevant to the realities of present-day life.
The rule of law has not been a central concept in Korean political and
cultural tradition. Law has served neither for the protection and ad-
vancement of human rights or commercial property rights, nor as a ve-
hicle for orderly social and political change. Rather, it has been
viewed more commonly as the personal instrument of those in power and,
not infrequently, as a support of governmental oppression. Such atti-
tudes have important consequences for Korea's democratization process
as well as for her industrial growth and commerce.
The Asia Foundation initially, then the Fulbright Program and more
recently AID/Korea, have recognized the ~lplications of this evolutionary
lag. They have supporcea projects along a broad front designed to stim-
ulate modernization of Korea's legal education and research, legal insti-
tutions and judicial practice, as well as the competence of members of
the various branches of the legal profession.
These efforts are beginning to show positive effects and should in
time produce at least one major institution, the SNU Graduate School of
Law, and perhaps a secondary one, the Korea Legal Center, committed to
change and capable of providing effective leadership. But change in
so complex and deep-rooted a system as law is a function of time and
lateral exposure. The International Legal Center is now engaged in
a three-year, AID-funded project in collaboration with the above-
mentioned institutions. It involves the exchange of legal scholars,
jurists, and pract icing lmvyers, academic and informational programs,
and other activities. Subject to satisfactory progress, this project
warrants continuation and perhaps expansion over a longer period.
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Public Administration. In Korea, as in many other developing
countries, the effectiveness of a wide array of government-supported
programs is gravely hampered by inadequacies of administration. The
constraint of administrative feasibility is no less serious a problem
for development programs than are shortages of raw materials, human
resources, and capital funds.
With the assistance of AID, much has already been done to strength-
en the administrative capabilities of the Korean Government. This is
evidenced, for example, in the work of the Economic Planning Board,
the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Government
Administration. In addition, a first-class center for advanced educa-
tion and research has been created in the SNU Graduate School of
Public Administration. In-service training of public officials has
been carried out on a large-scale through the National and Local Officials
Training Institutes.
Despite these advances, further progress can be achieved through
new approaches. One approach is the application of systems analysis
to programs carried out through two or more governmental agencies,
and frequently also involving one or more nongovernmental institutions.
A useful illustration is the situation of the Ministry of Education's
SNU College of Agriculture and the Ministry of Agriculture's Experi-
ment Station, which, though neighbors, do not function together. A
technical cooperation program might provide stimulus, sanction, and
expertise for studies of the administrative component in every program
effort, particularly from the standpoint of its relation to the over-
lapping activities of other government agencies. Such studies should
be linked with academic research, on the one hand, and the leading
centers of power and decision-making on the other.
Another administrative development approach would look beyond the
formal structures of the executive departments of government to the
roles that extra-governmental institutions can play in the implementa-
tion of official policies and programs. Government should be able to
rely increasingly on private agencies, corporations, associations,
local and regional authorities, and other entities for assistance and
cooperation in carrying out its goals. This would lighten the burden
carried by government units and allow them to perform their non-
transferable tasks with greater efficiency and effectiveness. The
strengthening of selected nongovernmental institutions and the devolu-
tion of various responsibilities to them opens a new range of problems
in developmental public administration. These offer a fertile field
for professional cooperation and research along both interdisciplinary
and comparative lines.
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~ The improvement of information systems in support of develop-ental objectives provides a third area of opportunity. Korea'sgovernment agencies, legislative and judicial bodies, universities
and technical institutes, and the private sector generally have
rapidly gro\ving information requirements. The function of KORSTIC
with respect to current scientific and technical publications has
already been noted. Analogous services are required in other fields
related to social and civic modernization and the social sciences.
Government archive facilities are utterly inadequate to meet the
demands of effective administration. There is urgent need to im-
prove the National and Diet Libraries and to devise means to link
the many separate and autonomous libraries now found in Korea so as
to optimize their effectiveness and utility. Many other measures -
from union cataloguing and the automation of bibliographic control
to the establishment of national councils and associations in related
professional fields - are needed to promote and coordinate the infor-
mation effort, to create a useful internal data network and to
facilitate linkage with external systems. (The automated biblio-
graphic system relating to Korea, sponsored by the Human Relations
Area Files in New Haven, Connecticut, is an obvious example.) U.S.-
Korean cooperation in academic and technical spheres could make a
decisive contribution toward providing Korea with an information
system more adequate for her needs.
Labor. Korea has an embryonic labor union movement in the Fed-
eration of Korean Trade Unions and its 16 constituent unions (with
a nominal membership of over 400,000). With continued industriali-
zation, Korea's workers can be expected to become an important social
force. Their unions may well become an effective potential vehicle
for pronloting worker welfare, self-help initiative, and participation
in political life.
At present, however, it appears that the government's attitude
toward labor is one of suspicion and restriction. Labor leadership
serves as an instrument of government to control the trade union
movement, rather than as a spokesman and guardian of labor interests.
The attitude of government is dictated perhaps as much by the need
to maintain a low-wages policy (to preserve Korea's competitive
advantage over neighboring countries) as by fear of labor acquir-
ing independent political strength and becoming a disruptive force.
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Despite the political sensitivities and economic dangers
that may attach to development of trade union activity, ,ve feel
it is important to promote a constructive and responsible Korean
labor movement. This will depend as much on the policies of
government - to obtain a more liberal and enlightened view of labor
and labor problems - as on the management cadres of industry and
the trade union leadership.
We believe that various approaches already considered by AID
deserve implementation and long-term support. These include the
use of American labor unions to·conduct training programs in trade
union leadership, skills development, organization and management
of cooperatives, housing and social welfare schemes; training of
labor leaders at the Asian Labor Education Center of the University
of the Philippines; support for the Sogang Labor Management Insti-
tute for its management-labor training and research programs in
cooperation with trade unions, employer groups, and other univer-
sities; u.s. training programs in worker-education techniques and
labor-management relations; and assistance to the Korean Federa-
tion of Trade Unions for improving union information activities.
The Legislature. Korea's evolution toward modern democratic
government will be aided in good measure by the ability of the
National Assembly to exercise more effectively and constructively
the powers given to it under Korea's constitution. It appears the
Assembly has not managed to do so till now, for a variety of reasons
not wholly related to the authoritarian character of the executive
branch. Weaknesses in party organization, as well as lack of co-
ordination (and often open competition) between the government
party and the President's Office have frequently handicapped the
operation of the Assembly. Ambiguity regarding the Assembly's
role vis-~-vis the executive, and the feebleness of the opposition
party and its lack of a distinctive program of its O'VU, are among
the many other factors that account for the Assembly's present
ineffectiveness.
While we recognize that the character and productiveness of a
legislative assembly are determined by complex, largely external
circumstances, the operational efficiency of the institution remains
susceptible to improvement by internal action. Several technical co-
operation activities are available, some of which have already been
used by The Asia Foundation. For instance, under the auspices of the
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American Political Science Association, Korean legislative staff mem-
bers have participated in our Congressional Intern Program.
Similar programs might be developed jointly for staff members and
legislators, especially those associated \~ith important Assembly com-
mittees. University law and political science teaching and research
programs \oIhich emphasize the improvement and professionalization of
law-making functions might be developed. In-service training programs,
seminars, and conferences for legislators and their staffs might serve
a similar purpose. All these approaches might derive added potency
and interest from the participation of American political scientists
versed in comparative legislative procedure, and from U.S. professional
federal and state legislative staff members.
Social Welfare, Health, and Family Planning. The first two Five-
Year Plans paid little attention to the social aspects of industrializa-
tion and development. Serious social problems caused by migration,
occupational dislocation, breakdmV11 of the traditional extended family
sys tcm and urban crm-lding, are expected to become even more acute in
the next decade as rapid industrialization continues.
Although it is still uncertain whether the Korean Government will
attack these problems in earnest, concern is no\ol cmergillg in various
government quarters as it becomes more apparent that these probleuls
pose a threat to stable economic growth. To undertake effective social
action, the Korean Government will surely have to enlarge its competence
in a broad range of planning, managem~nt, research, and training func-
tions related to labor and wage policies, social security, health
programs, and other social areas in which it has little or no prior
experience. It is thus possible to forecast a variety of urgent needs
for advisory services for the training of Koreans abroad, and for the
strengthening of indigenous training facilities in these social-problem
fields.
Substantial efforts have been devoted to family planning but Korea's
public health programs remain rudimentary. Rural areas particularly need
health services and better coverage by family planning programs. In the
formulation of ne\v or expanded health programs there appears to be an
unusual opportunity for experimenting with comprehensive delivery
systems which combine family planning and preventive medicine, while
emphasizing hygiene, improved sanitation, and better water supply and
food sources.
We assume the United States I conmlitment to the resolution of the
\
world population problem will persist into an indefinite future, and
that substantial funds will continue to be available in Washington
for this purpose. A nl1inber of ,veIl-established instrumentalities -
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the Population Council, International Planned Parenthood Federation,
for exaTIlple - are already receiving maj~r support from AID, and are
engaged in operations in Korea. We believe that, within the framework
of their contracts with AID, these organizations should continue in the
future to serve as the principal channels for U.S. resources intended
to help Korea in this problem area.
Public Saf~ty. The problem of internal security is likely to
persist as long as the two Koreas renlain in hostile confrontation. It
is possible that future circumstances will call for further U.S. assist-
ance in this area. Because of its sensitive character, we feel that
such assistance should continue to be handled on a direct government-
to-government basis, independent of the channels for technical coopera-
tion we advocate in this report.
The Elements of Technical Cooperation
Having indicated the areas which we deem appropriate to a continuing
technical cooperation program, ,~e now turn to the activities, techniques,
and instrumentalities that should compose it. These elements are actual-
ly cOTIlplenlcntary devices. They may be used in varying combinations in
different problelu areas and fields of endeavor, according to circumstances.
Facilitative and Referral Services. As already noted, it is ex-
pected that Korean Government agencies will be able increasingly to
assume the burden of paying for the technical services they wish to
obtain frOTIl the United States. Such financing can come from their own
resources, or from project and sector loans secured frOTIl the United
States, or from international lending institutions. Loan agreements
normally provide for the technical aspects of the project or program
being funded, but they leave responsibility for the procurement of ex-
perts, con~odities, etc. to the borrower. AID has furnished various
types of procurement assistance to the Korean Government, either as
an integral part of a loan-funded or concessional technical coopera-
tion project, or as a courtesy in the normal course of intergovern-
mental business. Such assistance has included contractual negotiations
with U.S. firms, institutions, and organizations; liaison with U.S.
federal agencies for the supply of technicians; and identification of
potential suppliers of services, commodities, and training. Need for
these and other types of assistance will persist, and should be seen
as an important aspect of a continued technical cooperation program.
Institutional Grants. We believe that institutional grants
constitute a flexible instrument adaptable to a wide range of purposes.
Subject to appropriate conditions and accountability, such grants have
the merit of placing on the grantee the burden of initiative and
responsbility for project implementation. Institutional grants should
be made at first to graduate or advanced-level educational, research \
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M
nd training institutions in Korea, on a limited and selective basis,
in order to develop the essential "breeder" establishments Korea
requires at the core of its educational," research, and training system.
rants for this ,purpose might be administered wholly by Korean institu-
tions, or jointly by Korean and Anlerican institutions, possibly through
university-to-university contracts. Grants might also be made to certain
lower-level educational and training institutions to stimulate the intro-
duction of educational innovations, new disciplines, and ne\v training
capabilities. '
I
Recipients of institutional grants might also include intermediate
organizations, such as the proposed Korean social science research
council, and other academic and intellectual bodies charged with pro-
moting the coordination of effort, exchange of information, and main-
tenance of professional standards. Two established organizations -
the Asia Foundation in Korea and the U.S. Educational Exchange (Fulbright)
Commission - which already serve as important channels for technical co-
operation, and whose concerns relate to many of the problem areas we
have identified, should also be assisted, via general-purpose or specif-
ic-purpose grants.
Individual Fe11mvships, Trai.ning Grants, etc. A program of
fellowships would permit individual Koreans of exceptional promise or
achievement to undertake study and research at the graduate and post-
doctoral levels, or to attend institutions for non--degree career-develop-
ment purposes, in the United States or third countries. This activity
should be supported as an essential ingredient of any sound program for
professional cooperation. It should be directed largely toward enhanc-
ing and maintaining the competence of high-quality people already
employed by priva te and public institutions in Korea. FellO\vships
should be fully funded for the anticipated duration of the sojourn
abroad and should include provision for the fel10\v's family to ac-
company him.-.-r
Continued support also should be given the Korean-American Tech-
nical Cooperation Association (KATCA) to help it develop as a major
liaison and processing agency providing the Korean Government and its
public agencies access to short-term, specialized training opportunities
to the United States and third countries. Such support should include
funds to allow KATCA in certain circumstances to supplement or match
Korean contributions toward training expenses.
*Present AID regulations, which make no such prOVL$LOnS, inhibit
sponsorship of foreign students for advanced graduate and post-
doctoral work in A~erican institutions.
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Advisors, Specialists, and Visiting Professors. A broad-gauge
flexible program is needed to help important institutions - especially
government agencies, industrial firms·, universities, and research
organizations - obtain from the United States and third countries the
services of advisors, specialists, and visiting professors who can make
a significant contribution to Korea. It is our assumption that much of
the professional and technical advice needed by Korean institutions
can be financed either by their own funds, through the institutional
grants discussed above, or from other sources. However, a means is
required to help identify sources of competent advice, to "top-up"
Korean financial r~,souq:es \vhen pee~ed, and occasionally to provide
the entire cost of individual or teams, if this is' essential to obtain -
high-quality talent.
U.S.-Korean Collaborative Research and Institutional Linkages.
A major effort is needed to stimulate and support professional collabora-
tion in a variety of forms between Koreans and Americans. Such collabo-
ration has a t\vo-fold purpose: to upgrade Korean competences rapidly
in selected fields, and to create effective and lasting linkages between
opposite-number institutions and individuals in the two countries. Use-
ful examples of this include the Japan-United States Program for
Scientific Cooperation, administered by the National Science Foundation;
the Sino-American Science Cooperation Program of the National Academy
of Sciences; the Sino-American Program for Cooperation in the Humanities
and Social Sciences of the American Council of Learned Societies and
the Social Science Research Council; and the International Liaison
Committee for Research on Korea (ILCORK). These and other arrangements,
such as collaboration between scholarly and professional associations
in Korea and the United States, and ad hoc seminars and conferences, can
be expected to yield clear dividends in such areas as joint study and
research, policy formulation, research design, and publications.
Sponsorship of Research and Innovative Projects. A fund should
be available to permit commissioned studies and sponsorship of Korean
research oriented to issues of wide public or governmental interest.
This program woulu extend the valuable work of the Trust Fund in pro-
moting the development of social science research in Korea but would
have more latitude with respect to the use of funds and selection of
research probleQs. The latter might include multi-disciplinary and
technical-feasibility studies designed to acquaint the government
with emerging problems and alternative courses of action.
Creativity and innovation in technical cooperation entails a
capacity to experiment, i.e., to risk funds on new approaches the
outcome of which is not easily predictable. We consider it highly
important that a continued technical cooperation program include the
provision of reasonable funds that can be used with flexibility and
dispatch to support exceptionally promising projects or ideas. It is
precisely in its ability to support such innovative and experimental
activities that a progrnm of professional and technical cooperation
differs most conspicuously from older and more conventional programs
of technical assistance.
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PART III. IMPLE~mNTATION
Organization
In addition to formulating the various needs and lines of action
that the panel feels to be important to the continuing progress of
Korea's development, we have given serious consideration to the matter
of implementing these recommendations. In broad terms ,ve have considered
the following issues;
1. How Korean and U.s. interests should be balanced
2. How governmental and private interests within both countries
should be balanced
3. Whether existing machinery is adequate or new machinery
desirable
Our conclusion is that a new institutional mechanism is required,
charged 'vith sponsorship, promotion, and (to a limited degree) adminis-
tration of the various activities detailed in the previous part of this
report. We have examined five alternative approaches to the implementation
of our recorrmendations, as described below. The fifth of these options
appears to be the best choice, to most of the members of the panel, and
comprises our main recommendation. To facilitate an understanding of the
discussion that follows, we set forth immediately the operational charc.c-
teristics of the ne\v organi~ation that appear necessary:
(1) Freedom, within the limits of its charter, to apply its
resources to priority objectives determined on the basis of
its own continuing study of Korean society and of the
country's developmental needs;
(2) Responsiveness to project proposals formulated and presented
by Koreans, without excluding the institution's mVll exercise
of initiative in stimulating requests for proposals;
(3) Capacity to respond to nongovernmental as well as governmental
requests;
(4) Maintenance of clear-cut separation between grant-making
processes and advisory functions;
(5) Commitment to innovation .and the support of experimental and
creative forms of technical cooperation;
(6) Procedures favoring prompt response to requests; and
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(7) Minimal operating functions, small administrative staff,
and 10'" overhead.
Of the various institutional and adnlinistrative approaches that
occurred to us, we concluded that an autonomous, nongovernmental organi-
zation with the characteristics outlined above would provide the most
suitable mechanism for the purposes we have recognized. Its name might
be the Korean-An1erican Development Institution (KADI). KADI could be a
bilateral organization, with joint funding and management, or it could be
a purely knerican organization, aided by a strong Korean advisory board.
We prefer the first of these alternatives - a bilateral organization -
assuming as a necessary pre-condition that Korea would undertake to con-
tribute part of KADI's core budget on a regular basis. Bilateral or not,
KADI would operate via grants and contracts, generally on a matching,
topping-up, or joint-participation basis with Korean recipient agencies.
The structural and operational characteristics of the various options
considered by our panel are examined in greater detail below.
1. Contin1J~d ?(!:ninistration of _techn~cal cooperation in Korf'a via AID/Korea.
This alternative has the advantage of enabling the U.S. governnlCnt to pursue
existing and new technical cooperation activities within existing machinery
without the necessity of securing ne,,, legislative and executi.ve sanctions.
This course appears to suffer from the following disadvantages, however.
a) It keeps technical cooperation largely within a government-
to-government context.
b) It maintains the complexity of legislative and administrative
restrictions that characterize direct operations of AID at
present.
c) It continues certain di.sadvantageous modes of operation and
conventions of administration that have become deeply rooted
in the ag~ncy during the last 20 years.
d) It maintains the fusion of advisory and fund-allocating
functions exercised by AID staff that has frequently been
the cause of ambivalence and cross-pressures among the staff
and clientele groups.
Moreover, it is probably correct to say that, given the limitations
under ,,'hich it nOH operates, AID is at a considerable disadvantage in the
market competition for the kinds of professional, scientific, and intel-
lectual talent that need to be mobilized for a new pattern of technical
cooperation in Korea.
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2. United States financial contributions administered through a
Korean governmental technical cooperation agency. This alternative
would have the advantage of placing initiative and responsibility
almost wholly in Korean hands. However, we consider this alternative
undesirable because:
a) In view of the centralization of decision-making in the
executive branch of the Korean Government, it ,,/QuId not
promote the emergence of pluralistic forces and institu-
tions.
b) It would not serve the interests of the United States well
in the event of a significant difference over priorities
arising between the two countries.
For these reasons we think it unwise to relinquish to any instru-
mentality of the Korean Government all but financial control for a
technical cooperation program.
3. United States financial contribution administered through a
Korean nonRovernmental organizatior:,. We did not give serious consid-
eration to this possibility because no existing agency appeared capable
of assuming this role; nor did we think the Korean Government would en-
dorse efforts to set up or work through such an instrumentality. In
any event, such an instrumentality would be unlikely to preserve for long
its independent character. .
4. Sponsorship of technical cooperation through a new American
nongovernmental or quasi-governmental organization. Such an organiza-
tion, wholly U.S.-funded and controlled, would offer the following
advantages:
a) It would enable the United States to work more freely than does
AID in nongovermnental sectors of Korean society and in prob-
lem areas to which the Korean Government does not currently
assign high priority.
b) It would free technical cooperation from some of the undesir-
able constraints that now handicap AID in the achievement of
its major objectives.
c) It might help to attract well-qualified individuals and
institutions, both in Korea and the United States, that are
reluctant to become involved with direct U.S. Government
operations, at least under existing rules and restrictions
applicable to AID.
Such an organization would make a clear-cut demarcation between
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its grant-making and advisory functions. An advisory body of Koreans
could play an important role in shaping its programs. The organiza-
tion would, of course, operate in response to Korean-initiated pro-
posals. It appears to us, nonetheless, that in excluding Koreans from
the processes of policy formulation and management, such an organiza-
tion could not give adequate recognition to the new relationship which
should be established between Korea and the United States, and to the
principle of cooperation itself.
5. Sponsorship of technical cooperation throuf,h a bilateral nongovern-
mental Korean-American orsanization. This alternative, providing for
joint financing and management, appears to have most of the advantages
of the last-cited option and yet avoids the disadvantage of indirect,
or nonexistent, Korean participation in policy formulation and adminis-
tration. It does, however, open the door to stronger intervention by
the Korean Government.
It seems clear that no practicable alternative ideally combines
all the advantages and eliminates all the disadvantages. Most members
of the panel feel that the fifth alternative cited is the most promising,
on the assumption that the Korean Government would regularly contribute
a significant portion of K/illI's core budget. We are confident that
certain structural safeguards can be given KADI that will afford reason-
able protection against Korean Government pressures that might limit
the independence of judgment and action we deem essential for the pro-
posed organization.
We proceed, therefore, with an elaboration of this first-choice
alternative. Later in this report we also indicate the various changes
that would be necessary for our second-choice alternative, namely a
wholly American organization, which we recommend in the event the Korean
Government is un\villing to contribute a significant portion of KADI's
core budget.
The Korean-American Development Institution (KADT) - (Bilateral Organization)
The following steps and provisions appear to us appropriate for the
establishment of KADI as a bilateral organization for the promotion and
sponsorship of technical cooperation programs between the United States
and Korea:
(1) KADI, by official agreement between the Governments of Korea
and the United States, should be established as a non-profit
corporation authorized to receive funds in both countries and
to make grants in Korea (or the United States) for purposes
sought by Koreans.
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(2) The purposes of KADI and its general structure and financing
should be spelled out in a note or agreement subscribed by
the U.S. and Korean Governments. This, in effect, would be
KADI's charter.
(3) The two governments should empower KADI to conduct its
business and use its funds as an autonomous organization
not subject to the internal procedures of either government,
~~KADI's programs and financial operations would be
subject to annual review by these governmerrt-s-.------~
-Responsibility for policy, budget, and management should
be vested in a bi-national board of trustees, which would
formulate a set of bylaws to be filed with both governments.
In developing its bylaws the board should consult informally
with the two governments.
The board of trustees should be composed of an equal
number of Korean and American members, perhaps five
of each nationality.
A majority of the members from each country should be
drawn from the nongovernmental sector, e.g. , develop-
ment organizations, professional associations, univer-
sities, scientific bodies, business, industry, and other
appropriate bodies.*
Selection of trustees for an organization such as KAnI will, of course,
require skill and sensitivity on the part of both governments. For the
United States, we suggest as a model the procedures used for the appoint-
ment of members of the National Science Board of the National Science
Foundation, i.e., selection on the basis of nominations from interested
professional associations and other groups. Such groups might include,
for instance, the Society for International Development, the Con~ittee
for Economic Development, the Agricultural Development Council, the
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, the Overseas Development
Council, the Anlerican component of the International Liaison Committee
for Research on Korea, the Social Science Research Council, American
Council of Learned Societies, the Association for Asian Studies, founda-
tions, and other bodies with interests in Korea and development. While
similar organizations are not plentiful in Korea, the Korean authorities
should be encouraged to usc a roughly analogous selection procedure.
Whatever procedures are used for selection, it is of the utmost importance
that trustees have strong individual competence in activities which KAnI
would pursue and (in the case of American trustees) knm,'leclge of developing
nations such as Korea. The American trustees should be prepared to parti-
cipate actively in the affairs of ~\DI and to consider themselves essential
links between KADI and diverse resources in the United States.
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(c) The American members should be named by the U.S.
Government after consultations with the Korean
Government. Similarly, Korean members should be
named after consultati.ons with the U.S. Government.
(d) Members of the board should serve five-year terms,
on rotation, and staggered so that at least one ne\~
member would be named each year from each country.
(e) Trustees should be bound by conf1ict-of-interest
prohibitions while serving on the board.
(f) The board should meet at least once a year, in Korea.
(g) The board should choose two co-chairmen from among
its members, one from each country. They should pre-
side over board meetings in rotation. Alternatively,
the board might choose a single chairman who would
serve a term of two years.
(h) The board should appoint KADI's director and other
core professional staff. The director should be an
ex-officio member of the board, without a vote. He
should not be able to substitute for any other trustee
at board meetings.
(i) The board should commission an annual audit of KAnI' s
financial affairs by an international ac~ounting firm.
It should also appoint visiting committees to review
the substance and administration of KAnI's activities.
(k) The board should approve the annual substantive and
financial reports to be presented by the director to
the two governments and other contributors.
(5) Within the general policies, programs, .and budgets approved
by the board of trustees, the director should have full au-
thority and responsibility to administer KADI and develop its
activities. The director's salary should be set at a level
fully competitive with that of comparable positions in the
United States, to ensure that KADI obtains a person of stature
and experience. At the outset, and for an indeterminate
period, the director should be an American; the deputy direc-
tor, a Korean. The director should appoint auxiliary staff,
all other specialists, consultants, and the like. Such staff
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should be appointed on term contracts and could be pay-
rolled through an appropriate existing organization in
the United States, in order; inter alia, to provide re-
tirement and insurance benefits.
(6) Subject to programs and budgets approved by its board of
trustees, the bulk of KADI's activiti.es \Vould be accomplished
through grants to Korean organizations, to American organiza-
tions \vhich would provide services to Korea, and to private
professional or other associations which involve Koreans
and Americans. KADI would provide professional and technical
services to Korea by contracting \Vith organizations or in-
dividuals in the United States. KADI \Vould also provide
individual grants in the form of fellmvships to Koreans for
advanced training, academic study, or research in the United
States. The director would execute all contracts and approve
all grants.
In addition to bringing consultants to Korea for specific
projects, KADI should obtain general-purpose advisers on
relatively long-term contracts. Such advisors would become
expert on a range of development problems in Korea, and
could be made available on loan as consultants to various
Korean institutions, public and private. These advisors
would not have authority to allocate KADI's funds. KADI also
might employ young Americans as interns.
(7) KADI should have a very small, high-quality professional and
clerical staff, and avoid building up an extensive administra-
tive superstructure. To the maximum possible extent, KADI
should contract with other organizations to provide certai~
auxiliary services entailed by its operations, such as the
preparation, orientation, and placement of fello\Vs and parti-
cipants for training abroad, the recruitment of experts, the
procurement of certain contract services for Korea, and rou-
tine logistical supporting facilities.
KADI could use the services of the U.S. Educational Exchange
(Fulbright) Commission and KATCA in Korea, the Institute of
International Education (lIE) and the Governmental Affairs
Institute, and other relevant agencies in the United States
to administer fello\Vships and training grants for Koreans
going to the United States. Similarly, various service or-
ganizations in the United States could be used to administer
contracts, salaries, and lozistics for Americans going to
Korea.
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KADI also could tap U.S. Government agencies, the Overseas
Educational Service, the Society for International Develop-
ment, foundations, and other established sources for help
in placing Koreans in the United States and recruiting
Americans for work in Korea. Should circumstances require
it, KAnI could establish a small office in the United States,
headed by a person with the rank of deputy director, to
facilitate liaison with American resource and supporting
institutions, organizations, and other appropriate entities.
KADI - (A Wholly American Technical Cooperation Institution)
The second alternative is a U.S.-controlled organization, identified
in option 4 (page 37). If this alternative were adopted, assuming
that the Korean Government would make no contribution to KAnI's core
budget, the following changes from the structure just outlined for KADI
would be desirable:
(1) KAnI probably could and should be registered as a non-profit
corporation in Korea and the United SLates, rather than in-
volving an official agreement between the two governments.
(2) The board of trustees would be wholly American; Koreans would
not participate in the policy, budget, and management decisions
of the organization.
(3) A strong Korean advisory committee should be established, in
parallel with the American board of trustees. This committc~
should be used continually by the American director of the
organization, and the American board of trustees should meet
with it at least once a year. The Korean advisory committee
would have no vote or power of decision, however."·
(4) Core financing for the organization should be provided
entirely by the U.S. Government, and would not involve mixed
U.S. and Korean contributions. However, the organization
would elicit matching funds from Korean public and private
sources in its grants program.
Otherwise, the operations of the two organizations under alterna-
tives 4 and 5 would be the same.
Financing
1. We consider it of first importance that KAnI be given rea-
sonable assurAnce of adequate and continuing funding to enable it to
pursue activities of high quality and performance. Inadequate or un-
certain funding would, inter alia, make it impossible to obtain highly
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competent staff. We suggest that a core budget for KADI be assured for
at least five years and preferably ten years, i.e., the decade of the
1970's.
2. We recommend that KAnI's core budget, after an initial
growth period, of say, two years, be set at a plateau of $5 million
per year. We arrive at this estimate on the basis of present and
foreseeable needs in Korea, and of the managerial capacities of the
small administrative organization we envisage for KAnI. An illustra-
tive budget for categories of activity follows:
Professional and technical services
Collaborative research and policy formulation
Grants to individuals for advanced training and
research
Institutional development
Administration (c.10%}- ~
TOTAL
($000)
700
300
1,000
2,500
500
$5,000
3. We believe that 60 to 80 percent of KADI's expenditures
would be in dollars, and the balance in~. The reason for the
higher proportion of dollars is that we assume the major share of
KADI's funds \~uld be used for international travel, tuition fees,
and living expenses for Koreans studying and doing research in the
United States, for salaries of Americans working in Korea, and for
purchase of equipment and books made in the United States for Korean
institutions.
4. Funding of KADI's core budget should be provided by the U.S.
and Korean Governments in a ratio to be established in the basic agree-
ment. We believe that the United States should provide not· more than
80 percent of the proposed KAnI annual core budget and Korea the balance,
on the assumption that our first preference - a bilateral organization -
proves feasible. We suggest here only the salient characteristics this
should attach to this financing~
a) An initial sum of, say, $2 million should be held as a re-
serve fund for payment of salaries of core staff of KADI and
for orderly completion of activities in progress should KP~I
cease to operate for any reason. The purpose of this fund
would be to assure that KADI can appoint staff of high quality
and can undertake continuing activities with the assurance
they will not be subject to sudden termination.
b) Annual sustaining funds equivalent to $5 million should be
given to KADI as unrestricted grants. The U.S. contribution
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(the $4 million in foreign exchange needed annually) might
be made available by special appropriation channeled through
the Agency for Intcrnationa~ Development, the Nationd1
Science Foundation, or the Department of State; through leg-
islative authorization to use repayments from hard-currency
conunodity sales or development loans; or by a combination
of these sources. Whatever the sources of funds, we feel
it is crucial to the effective operation of KAnI that its
funds not be subject to the manifold restrictions that now
apply to regular AID funds. These restrictions would be
inimical to the characteristics (pages 35-36) and the mode of
yoperation (pages 38-42) we prescribe for KAnI. We consider
the critical requirements that would permit KAnI to function
in the manner we intend to be as follows: (1) assured long-term
support) at least for five years and preferably ten years) to
allow KADI, inter alia, to recruit staff of high competence and
to undertake tasks requiring' long-term commitment, (2) freedom
to operate as a self-governing quasi-private institution.
5. We believe there is no realistic prospect that private sources
in Korea or the United States would provide adequate and continuing
support for KADI's core budget. Private sources could provide impor-
tant supplements for individual activities or projects, however. In
the event KADI is established by agreement between the two governments,
we feel it would be desirable for the Korean Government to consider
legislation that would grant tax exemption to private persons and
corporations which contribute to KADI, and to other non-profit scientif-
ic and educational institutions operating in Korea in the public inter~st.
6. We suggest that grants and other support by KAnI to Korean
organizations be provided on a matching, topping-up) or joint-parti-
cipation basis. The purpose of this would be to assure commitment by
recipient organizations and to multiply KAnI's resources. ·It is
reasonable to expect that KAnI's funds would) overall, be matched by
Korean recipient organizations.
7. We suggest that the Korean Government provide housing for
KAnI, preferably in a building of its own, to be donated by the Korean
Government. The Korean Government should also be expected to exempt
KAnI's American personnel (staff, resident advisors, consultants, etc.)
from local income taxes; and to waive duties on all commodities imported
for KADI's own use or in conjunction with technical cooperation projects.
Interim Measures
We are strongly convinced that no steps should be taken to establish
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KADI, \vhether as a bilateral or an American organization, until con-
ditions essential for its effective operation can be fully assured.
In our judgment, these essential condttions are (1) stability of
financial support and (2) autonomy of operation. To establish KADI
without meeting these conditIons - t-i1-at--f~~- subject KADI to the
procedure of annual budget submission, the vagaries of the legisla-
tive appropriations process, and the constraints and controls on
expenditures and activities of one or both governments - would be
tantamount to continuing technical cooperation in its present form
under a different label. Such a premature move would immediately
vitiate KADI's fundamental character and purpose as we conceive them.
We appreciate the fact that it may require considerable time to
obtain the necessary statutory changes which would permit KADI to be
set up on a proper basis. Meamvhile, we understand, AID \vishes to
provide for the continuity of a technical cooperation program in Korea
by appropriate action on some of the problem areas identified in this
report. We assume this would allow certain current programs to con-
tinue and others to be initiated pending their eventual transfer to
KADI sponsorship when it comes into being, if desired at the time.
So long as its technical assistance machinery remains in operation
in Korea, AID should, of course, be able to sustain programs in a
number of fields. It can do so directly or through other instrumen-
talitieF, though in either case it would be subject to the limitations
we described in our analysis of alternative 1. (page 36).
There are at present two other American agencies engaged in
technical cooperation in Korea which are concerned to a greater
or lesser extent with the problem areas we have identified. These
are The Asia Foundation and the U.S. Educational Exchange Comnission.
They are supported in whole or in part by the U.S. Government. There
are, of course, many other organizations and institutions in the
United States which could undertake specific projects, under contract
in Korea.
We recommend that, in the immediate future, AID makes maximum
use of available Korea-based and U.S.-based instrumentalities to
carry forward the program suggestions advocated in this report that
have imnlediate priority interest, and for which these instrumentalities
are peculiarly suited by virtue of their competence and modes of opera-
tion.
For example, The Asia Foundation in Korea, if provided with
additional funding, could enlarge the scope of its work in the areas
of social modernization in which it is already engaged. The U.S.
Educational Exchange COl,mlission, which has recent ly reoriented its
purpose from the promotion of general cultural interchange to the
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strengthening of national development, could also be used to administer
an expanded program of fellowships and advanced training grants.
There is substantial merit" to t~c idea of strengthening the work
of these agencies, and also of obtaining the participation of other
organizations not yet engaged in Korea. This approach is in line
with the intent of this report. It would have the further advantage
of facilitatins YJillI's transition to full-scale operation without
imposing an excessive burden on it prematurely. KADI will need time
to organize itself. It should launch its activities on a modest scale,
gradually enlarging their scope. As AlDis grants and service contracts
with these agencies expirec, KADI would be able to access their pro-
grams and to consider their requests for further general or project
support.
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Annex A
INSTITUTIONS VISITED A~~ PERSONS CONSULTED
KOREAN MINISTRIES
Economic Planning Board
Kim Hak Yul, Deputy Prime Minister
Kim Joo Nam, Director, Bureau of the Budget
Agriculture and Fisheries
Cho Si IIyong, Ninister
Hahn Bong Soo, Planning Coordinator
Institute of Forest Genetics, Seoul
Office of Rural Development, Suwon
Education
Hong Jong Chul, Ninister
Paik Hyun Ki, Director, Central Education Research Institute
T. J. Song, Superintendent of Education, Chollo Namdo Province
Government Administration
Lee Souck Jae, Ninister
Dong Hong Wook, Director, Administrative Management Bureau
Chung Sc Woong, Director-General, Central Officials Training Institute
Health and Social Affairs
Kim Won Kyu, Planning Coordinator
Home Affairs
Park Kyung Won, Minister
Kim Bong Kyun, Superintendent General, Chief of Foreign Affairs
Division, Korea National Police
Science and Technology
Kim Kee Hyong, Minister
Moon Young Chul, Director, Technical Cooperation Bureau
Lee Man Yong, Chief, Bilateral Cooperation Division
Lee Eung Sun, Director, Policy and Development Bureau
Hong Min Loo, Director, Research Coordination Office
OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS
Shin Dong Shik, Senior Economic Secretary to the President of the
Republic of Korea
Kim I~ung Ki, Economic and Scientific Council
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General Lee Honkon, Chairman, President's Advisory Commission on
Government Administration
Kim Hyun Ok, Nayor of Seoul
PROMI}ffiNT KOREANS
Lee Hahn Been, Dean, School of Public Administration, Seoul National
Univer s ity
Yu Chin 0, Leader of National Democratic Party
Chang Key Young, Publisher, Korean Times
Song In Sang, President, Korean Development Association
Paik Seung Gil, Editor, Korea Journal
Kim Young Goo, Editorial Writer, Hanguk Ilbo
Lim Bang Hyun, Editorial Writer, Hanguk Ilbo
Nam Jae Hee, Chief, Editorial Writer, Chosun Ilbo
ACADEl'lIC INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL FACULTY MEl'lBERS
Seoul National University
Choe Mun Whan, President
Pyo Hyun Koo, Dean, College. of Agriculture
Paul Ryu, Dean, Graduate School of Law
Deans of Faculties of Arts and Sciences, Technology, Medicine
Education, Pharmacy
Korea University
Lee Choong Woo, President
Kim Yong Choon, Department of Chemical Engineering
Kim Kak Choong, Professor of Physical Chemistry
Kim Chang Whan, Dean, College of Science and Engineering, Entomological
Institute
Kim Jun Yop, Professor of History; Associate Director,.Asiatic
Research Center
Chosun University
Dean of Students
Registrar
Han Yang University
Joseph Rainam Lee, Dean, Academic Affairs
Kim Kyu Tai, Department of Civil Engineering
Yeong II Seo, Department of Mechanical Engineering
Chun Nam University
K. G. Kim, Dean, College of Agriculture
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Yonsei University
Han Man ChOOD, Dean, College of Science and Engineering; Director,
Yonsei Engineering Research Center .
Kim Kun Duk, Department of Architectural Engineering
Lee Hyun Sik, Department of Mechanical Engineering
Byun Keun Joo, Department of Civil Engineering
Hahn Pyong Choon, Professor of Law
Lee Ki Baik, Professor of Korean History, Sogang College
Nam Duck Woo, Professor of Economics. Sogang College
Moon Seung Kyu, Professor of Rural Sociology, Chonpuk University
OTHER KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
Mr. Suh, President
Hyo Chul Ahn, N<mager, Research Department
Korean Institute for Research in Behavioral Sciences: Chung Bum Mo,
President
Korean Productivity Center: Lee Byun Wook, Managing Director
Agriculture and Fishery Developme.nt Corporation
Tchah Kyun Hi, President
Lee Duck Soo, Vice President
Korean Federation of Industries
W. H. Kim, President
Kim Ip Lam, Director-General
Korean Shipping Corporation: Chu Yo Han, President
Korea Scientific and Technological Information Center (KORSTIC)
Kim Chong Hwae, Head, Division of Resources
Kim Doo Hong, Secretary General
Lee Chang Kyo, Chief, Documentation Division
Korean-American Technical Cooperati?n Association (KATCA)
Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST)
Choi Hyung Sup, President
Shin Eun Gun, Vice President, Administration
Shim Mum Taik. Vice President, Research
Wun Jung, Principal Investigator, Solid State Physics Lab.
Sung Ki Soo, Manager, EDP Department
Choi Ki Sang, Chief, Public Relations Division
Dong Yang Machinery Works, Ltd.
Kim Doo Hoon, Director
Kim Ryang Bak, Managing Director
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The Central National Library: Chang 11 Se, Chief Librarian, Technical
Services Department
National Assembly Library: Kang Chu Chin, Director
U.N. AGENCIES
Hans W. Kamberg, Resident Representative, UNDP
Ma Chia chi, Representative, WHO
U. S. GOVERffi'lENT
His Excellency William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador
USON
Henry J. Costanzo, Director
Thomas F. Olmstead, Assistant Director, Program
Bascom H. Story, Public Services Advisor
Harry T. Searle, Training Officer
Charles A. Foster, Chief Education Advisor
Dallas VJ. Hunter, Public Administration Advisor
John Cooper, Chief, Food and Agriculture
John B. Swecker, AEriculture Extension Officer
Lawrence C. Kapp, Agronomist
Laverne E. Wakefield, Fisheries Advisor
Kenneth B. Platt, Agriculture Education
Bruce Johnson, Industrial Development Advisor
Leonard Rand Anton, Private Enterprise Investment Advisor
USIS
Carl F. Bartz, Jr., Cultural Attach~
U. S. FOUNDATIONS AIm ORGANIZATIONS
Asia Foundation
John Bannigan, Representative
Cho Tong Jae, Program Advisor
American-Korean Foundation: Dorothy M. Frost, Vice President for
Operations in Korea
U. S. Educational Con~ission in Korea: Edward R. Wright, Jr., Executive
Director
Population Council: Mr. Finnegan, Representative
International Legal Center: Mr. Phillips, Representative
Battelle Memorial Institute
Robert I. Leininger, Resident Representative
W. J. Harris, Jr., Assistant Director, Washington, D.C.






